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Galbraith Almost Docs

Professor Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard is a wise and witty man. He not only thinks he knows everything, he almost does. After all, he is one of the most original and creative economists of our times; he writes so well you'd never guess he was a scholar; he was the managing editor of Fortune; he has been our Ambassador to India; he has written some of the best speeches Stevenson, Kennedy, and Johnson ever gave. But not even Galbraith can disentangle Johnson from the Vietnam war, although he has certainly been trying.

Galbraith came all the way down to Washington to tell his liberal friends that the Vietnam policy is horrid, but Johnson is not to blame for it. The villain, we learn, is the "Establishment," which, in the rather specialized world of diplomacy, is thought of as a relatively small number of prominent Wall Street lawyers and bankers, and their influential satellites.

President Johnson, Galbraith disclosed, is really "a force for restraint and against the old foreign policy." This wicked old policy, which apparently is the cause of our current Asian woes, seems to be the product of "the foreign-policy syndicate of New York—the Dulles, McCloy, Lovett communion, with which I am sure Secretary Rusk would wish to be associated, and of which Dean Acheson is a latter-day associate."

Spelled out, this means the late John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State, and his brother, Allen, former head of the CIA. Both were Wall Street lawyers. It also means John McCloy, another distinguished lawyer, former head of the Chase National Bank, former head of the World Bank, former High Commissioner to West Germany. Lovett is Robert Lovett, Wall Street partner of Averell Harriman and former Secretary of Defense.

Other great names associated with the Establishment are Arthur Dean, former law partner of Dulles and U. S. disarmament adviser; Douglas Dillon, former Ambassador to France and former Secretary of the Treasury; General Lucius Clay; and the late Henry Stimson, former Secretary of War and patron of McGeorge Bundy, who has just retired from the White tion and, no doubt, a fresh candidate for the Establishment himself.

So there they are, running our foreign affairs while the President sits helplessly by—everybody knows how LBJ likes to sit helplessly by and let others run the country. Anyhow, Professor Galbraith's advice to his liberal colleagues was to stop criticizing the President, and help him get rid of the bad influences around him: disestablish the Establishment.

The funny thing about all this is that nobody laughed, maybe because this old wives' tale has a certain plausibility, and has been long bruited about in liberal circles.

It is true that these Establishmentarians carry weight and are taken seriously, but if they really are calling the turn, Professor Galbraith was a long time discovering it, for they were even more prominent and influential under Kennedy than they are now under Johnson. Kennedy made Dillon the head of the Treasury; he offered both Defense and State to Lovett; he brought Rusk in as foreign secretary; he relied on General Clay in the Berlin crisis; he used Arthur Dean on disarmament; he turned constantly to Acheson for advice.

Actually these men and others mentioned here have been serving both Democratic and Republican Administrations for twenty years or more, beginning with Roosevelt's appointment of Stimson and Forrestal at the beginning of the war. Truman also called on them; he even drafted John Foster Dulles to negotiate the peace treaty with Japan.

All in all, the Establishment hierarchy has served the country well and faithfully for over a generation, but, with the possible exception of the Eisenhower regime, they did not make the big decisions or try to usurp the Presidential role. And even the unassertive Eisenhower, in crises like Indochina and Suez and the Congo, finally made up his own mind.

Roosevelt was his own Secretary of State as well as Commander-in-Chief. Truman made all the key decisions, whether it was Korea or dropping the atom bomb. Kennedy, as we know, did not consult the Establishment on the Bay of Pigs or the Cuban missile crisis or on Laos. And there is no record, either, of Johnson substituting Establishment thinking for his own

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